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A commentary on
Likelihood Ratio as Weight of Forensic Evidence: A Closer Look
by Lund, S. P., and Iyer, H. (2017). J. Res. Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. 122:27. doi: 10.6028/jres.122.027
A recent article (Lund and Iyer, 2017) provides, in the words of its title, a closer look at the
likelihood ratio as the weight of forensic evidence. This note comments critically on two aspects
of the article.
The first aspect concerns two related statements. In the abstract the statement is made that “[W]e
find the likelihood ratio paradigm to be unsupported by arguments of Bayesian decision theory,
which applies only to personal decision making and not to the transport of information from an
expert to a separate decision maker.” The idea presented in this statement of lack of support for
the likelihood ratio as a means of transport of information is repeated in the conclusion where it is
stated that “. . . we hope the forensic science community comes to view the LR as one possible, not
normative or necessarily optimum, tool for communicating to DMs (decision makers)” (Lund and
Iyer’s emphasis). Despite this opinion of these authors, it was shown many years ago by I.J.Good in
two brief notes in the Journal of Statistical Computation and Simulation (Good, 1989a,b) repeated
in Good (1991) and in Aitken and Taroni (2004) that, with some very reasonable assumptions, the
assessment of uncertainty inherent in the evaluation of evidence leads inevitably to the likelihood
ratio as the only way in which this can be done.
In order to show that the likelihood ratio is the only way to evaluate evidence, it is necessary
to introduce some mathematical notation. This is a device to ease the presentation of the
argument. The argument could be made verbally but would be lengthy and more difficult to
follow. Consider evidence E which it is desired to evaluate in the context of two mutually
exclusive propositions Hp and Hd. Denote the value of the evidence by V . Of course, this
statement makes the implicit assumption that evidence has a value that can be measured. The
value will depend on background information I. Four and only four factors have been introduced,
E,Hp,Hd and I. Thus, V is a function of these four factors, V = f (E,Hp,Hd, I). There is
uncertainty about E, so it should be analyzed probabilistically. Use of the argument of conditional
probability leads to f (E | Hp,Hd, I)f (Hp,Hd, I), rather than forms such as f (Hp | Hd,E, I)
or variants of it. The expression f (Hp,Hd, I) does not involve the evidence, which reduces
considerations further to f (E | Hp,Hd, I). Propositions Hp and Hd are mutually exclusive so
if E is to be a function of both Hp and Hd then f (E | Hp,Hd, I) is a combination of two
functions, one that involves Hp and not Hd and one that involves Hd and not Hp. Value may
thus be expressed as a function of the probabilities of E given Hp (and I) and of E given Hd
(and I). Again, this makes implicit assumptions, namely that there is a probability that can be
associated with evidence and that is dependent on a proposition and background information.
For ease of notation explicit mention of I will be omitted from notation in what follows.
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Let x = Pr(E | Hp) and y = Pr(E | Hd). The assumption
that V is a function only of these probabilities can be represented
mathematically as
V = f (x, y)
for some function f .
Now, consider another piece of evidence T which is irrelevant
to E, to Hp and to Hd. Irrelevance is taken in the probabilistic
context to be equivalent to independence so that T may be taken
to be independent of E, ofHp and ofHd. It is then permissible for
Pr(T) to be given notation which does not refer to any of E,Hp or
Hd. Thus, let Pr(T) be denoted by θ . Then
Pr(E,T | Hp)
= Pr(E | Hp) Pr(T | Hp) by the independence of E and T
= Pr(E | Hp) Pr(T) by the independence of Tand Hp
= x θ .
Similarly,
Pr(E,T | Hd) = y θ .
The value of (E,T) is f (θx, θy) by the definition of f . However,
evidence T is irrelevant and has no effect on the value of evidence
E. Thus, the value of the combined evidence (E,T), f (θx, θy), is
equal to the value V of E, f (x, y), and
V = f (x, y) = f (θx, θy)
for all θ in the interval [0,1] of possible values of Pr(T).
The only class of functions of (x, y) for which this can be said
to be the case is the class which are functions of x/y or
Pr(E | Hp)/Pr(E | Hd)
which is the likelihood ratio. Hence the value V of evidence has
to be a function of the likelihood ratio. Lund and Iyer wish the
forensic community to view the likelihood ratio as one possible
tool for communication with decision makers. We hope that we
have shown here through the argument of Good that it is the only
logically admissible form of evaluation. Incidentally, note that
no recourse has been made to arguments of Bayesian decision
theory. The support of these arguments for the likelihood ratio
paradigm, as suggested in the abstract, is not necessary.
The second aspect is minor and concerns a definition. The
concept of weight of evidence is an old idea. The term weight
of evidence for the logarithm of the likelihood ratio was given by
Charles Sanders Peirce (Peirce, 1878). It is not the likelihood ratio
that should be referred to as the weight of evidence as is done in
the title of the article. It is better to refer to the likelihood ratio
as the value of the evidence and its logarithm as the weight of the
evidence. The logarithm of the likelihood ratio has the pleasingly
intuitive operation of additivity when converting the logarithm
of the prior odds in favor of a proposition to the logarithm of the
posterior odds in favor of the proposition.
log
{
Pr(Hp | E)
Pr(Hd | E)
}
= log
{
Pr(E | Hp)
Pr(E | Hd)
}
+ log
{
Pr(Hp)
Pr(Hd)
}
. (1)
When considering the scales of justice it is the logarithm of the
probabilities of the evidence given each of the two competing
propositions that should be put in the scales, not the probabilities.
Equation (1) can be rewritten as
log{Pr(Hp | E)} − log{Pr(Hd | E)} =
log{Pr(E | Hp)} − log{Pr(E | Hd)} + log{Pr(Hp)} − log{Pr(Hd)}
= [log{Pr(E | Hp)} + log{Pr(Hp)}]− [log{Pr(E | Hd)} + log{Pr(Hd)}]
Expressions to the left of the negative sign in the last line are
associated with one pan in the scales, expressions to the right
with the other pan. Thus log(Pr(E | Hp)) is added to the prior log
probability forHp in one scale and log(Pr(E | Hd)) is added to the
prior log probability for Hd in the other scale. The difference in
the sums of the two pairs of log probabilities is a more intuitive
characteristic of the evidence to which the term weight may be
applied than the ratio of the probabilities of the evidence given
the respective propositions.
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